Motivated in part by the problem of secure multicast distributed storage, we analyze secrecy rates for a channel in which two transmitters simultaneously multicast to two receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper. Achievable rates are calculated via extensions of a technique due to Chia and El Gamal and also the method of output statistics of random binning. An intriguing synergy is observed between the achievable rate expressions arising from the two techniques: the rate region of the latter is simplified via a constraint that is discovered while deriving the former rate region. Outer bounds are derived for both the degraded and non-degraded versions of the channel, and examples are provided in which the inner and outer bounds meet. The inner bounds recover known results for the multiple-access wiretap channel, broadcast channel with confidential messages, and the compound MAC channel. An auxiliary result is also produced that characterizes the minimal randomness necessary to achieve secrecy in multiple-access wiretap channels.
of multiple users to data in a distributed cache, which is a multi-transmitter (multiple-access) multicast scenario [4] , [5] . This problem is also equivalent to a compound two-state multipleaccess wiretap channel. It has been known [6] that problems involving compound channels have an equivalent multicast representation, in which the channel to each multicast receiver is equivalent to one of the states of the compound channel.
In recent years the study of strong and semantic secrecy has gained momentum [7] , [8] , motivated by its operational significance and enabled by the introduction and/or increased popularity of new achievability techniques such as resolvability [9] [10] [11] and output statistics of random binning (OSRB) [12] . Strong secrecy implies weak secrecy, reducing the motivation to study the latter when the former is tractable. That said, weak secrecy retains interest and utility because the codebook design techniques that are aimed at weak and strong secrecy can produce different achievable rate expressions, especially in complex networks. This work studies two different achievability methods, one of which yields weak secrecy and the other, strong secrecy.
The achievable rate of the latter method is simplified by introducing a constraint that appears through the derivation of the secrecy region of the former.
These achievability techniques are related to two recent results in network information theory [12] , [13] . First, the method of Chia and El Gamal [13] uses Marton coding and indirect decoding (also known as non-unique decoding) [14] to achieve an improved secrecy rate for the transmission of a common message to two receivers that may experience different channel statistics. In particular, [13, Lemma 1] gives an upper bound on the number of codewords that are typical with an eavesdropper's received sequence. We extend the method of Chia and El Gamal to multiple transmitters, and introduce a corresponding two-level Marton-type coding with associated non-unique decoding.
The second method, OSRB [12] (see also [15] for a related approach), analyzes channel coding problems by conversion to a related source coding problem, where it tests achievability by probability approximation rather than counting arguments on typical sets. A reverse conversion is needed to complete the analysis. OSRB is well suited for secrecy problems, which are also associated with probability approximation. OSRB encoding is purely by random binning and is enabled by (and named after) the following key result: applying two independent random binning schemes on the same set, the two bin indices are statistically independent as long as binning rates are sufficiently small. We extend the tools and techniques of OSRB to match the requirements of the two-transmitter multicast problem.
In addition to extending, modifying, and adapting these two techniques for a multi-transmitter setting, our work showcases their relative merit and their relation to each other in a new context. This is independently of interest because the issue of the relative size of the achievability region provided by these two techniques has been broached [12] , where it was shown that in one specific problem OSRB can provide a larger achievable rate region, but in a broader sense the question remains open and is of interest to the community.
Finally, outer bounds for degraded and non-degraded channels are derived and shown to be tight against inner bounds in some special cases. In addition, the extension of the method of Chia and El Gamal is utilized to highlight the minimal amount of randomness required to achieve secrecy rates of the multiple-access wiretap channel, and that therein channel prefixing can be replaced with superposition, in a manner reminiscent of Watanabe and Oohama [16] for minimizing the randomness resources for secrecy encoding. Part of the results, including the proof of the outer bounds, are available in the conference version of this paper [17] and are not duplicated here in the interest of brevity.
A brief outline of the related literature is as follows. Multicasting with common information in the presence of an eavesdropper has been studied in [18] , [19] , deriving inner bounds on secrecy capacity, and in some special cases also deriving secrecy capacity region. Salehkalaibar et al. [18] studied a one-receiver, two-eavesdropper broadcast channel with three degraded message sets.
Ekrem and Ulukus [19] studied the transmission of public and confidential messages to two legitimate users, in the presence of an eavesdropper. Benammar and Piantanida [20] calculated the secrecy capacity region of some classes of wiretap broadcast channels.
The MAC wiretap channel has been investigated in [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . In [21] , a discrete memoryless February 26, 2019 DRAFT MAC with confidential messages has been studied that consists of a MAC with generalized feedback [28] where each user's message must be kept confidential from the other. The multiple access wiretap channel [22] , [23] , [27] consists of a MAC with an additional channel output to an eavesdropper. In [22] , [23] , achievable rate regions for the secrecy capacity region have been derived. Secrecy in the interference channel and broadcast channel has been studied in [29] , where inner and outer bounds for the broadcast channel with confidential messages and the interference channel with confidential messages have been compared. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the notation and the system model.
Section III presents a general inner bound on the secrecy capacity region under the weak secrecy regime. Section IV produces an outer bound for the degraded model and discusses its implications. Section V derives a general outer bound and provides an example where this outer bound is optimal. Section VI presents a general achievable rate region under the strong secrecy regime.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters and their realizations by lower case letters. The set of ǫ−strongly jointly typical sequences of length n, according to p X,Y , is denoted by T (n) ǫ (p X,Y ). For convenience in notation, whenever there is no danger of confusion, typicality will reference the random variables rather than the distribution, e.g., T (n)
ǫ (X, Y )} for a fixed y n , when the fixed sequence y n is clear from the context, is denoted with the shorthand notation T (n) ǫ (X|Y ). Superscripts denote the dimension of a vector, e.g., X n . The integer set {1, . . . , M} is denoted by 1, M , and X [i:j] indicates the set {X i , X i+1 , . . . , X j }. The cardinality of a set is denoted by | · |. We utilize the total variation between probability mass functions (pmfs), defined by ||q − p|| 1 = 1 2
is the probability of the encoder producing the codeword x n i for the message
The probability of error is given by: 
Definition 3. A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable under strong secrecy if there exists a sequence of (M 1,n , M 2,n , n) codes with M 1,n ≥ 2 nR 1 , M 2,n ≥ 2 nR 2 , so that P e n→∞ − − → 0 and
Definition 4. p X ≈ q X indicates p X − q X 1 < ǫ. For two random pmfs [30] , P X ≈ Q X indicates
III. ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION FOR THE WEAK SECRECY REGIME
We start with a lemma that fits Marton coding with indirect decoding in a MAC structure and produces an entropy bound needed in the secrecy analysis. Its basic idea can be highlighted as follows: given X n , if we independently produce 2 nR random codevectors Y n , we will have approximately 2 nR−I(X n ;Y n ) jointly typical pairs, i.e., the "excess" rate will determine the number of jointly typical pairs. This lemma extends the basic idea of excess rate to multiple codebooks, multiple conditioning, and furthermore, a generalization is made from a counting argument to the entropy of the index of the codebook, which is essential for secrecy analysis.
according to
Let L ∈ 1, 2 nS and K ∈ 1, 2 nT be random variables with arbitrary pmf. If
for a positive δ 1 (ǫ) and if for an arbitrary sequence Z n ,
where
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
This result is related to, and contains, [13, Lemma 1] . In particular, [13] considers a singleinput channel and explores the properties of codebooks driven by this input, while observing an output Z. In contrast, this paper's Lemma 1 develops a corresponding result for a multiple-access channel with respect to Z, motivated by the two-transmitters present in the model of this paper.
This accounts for the new features of our Lemma 1, namely three rate constraints instead of one, as well as monitoring the entropy of two index random variables instead of one. Furthermore, the present result has one additional layer of conditioning to allow for indirect decoding of multiple confidential messages in the sequel, while in [13] only one confidential message is decoded.
Remark 1. In addition to enabling the main results of this paper, Lemma 1 also has broader
implications on the necessity of prefixing in multi-transmitter secrecy problems [32] and deriving the minimum amount of randomness needed to achieve secrecy. Csiszár and Körner introduced prefixing in [33] [13] . Appendix B extends 
• . . . Fig. 3 . Coding scheme for the first transmitter
for some
such that
The proof uses superposition coding, Wyner's wiretap coding, Marton coding, as well as indirect decoding.
This result recovers several known earlier results:
• By setting Z = ∅, U 0 = U 1 = U 2 = X 1 , and V 0 = V 1 = V 2 = X 2 , the result in Theorem 1 reduces to the capacity region of compound multiple access channel discussed in [1] .
• By setting
Theorem 1 reduces to the achievable rate region of multiple access wiretap channel without common message [22] [23] [24] .
• By setting • By setting X 2 = ∅ (or X 1 = ∅), the result in Theorem 1 reduces to the achievable rate region for two-receiver, one-eavesdropper wiretap channel presented in [13 
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 1 by setting U 0 = U 1 = U 2 and V 0 = V 1 = V 2 and considering the fact that the channel is degraded.
IV. AN OUTER BOUND FOR THE DEGRADED MODEL
We develop an outer bound for the degraded version of the model and show an example where it meets the inner bound (Theorem 1).
Definition 5. The degraded two-transmitter two-receiver channel with confidential messages
obeys:
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity region for the degraded two-transmitter two-receiver channel with confidential messages is included in the set of rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
for some joint distribution
Proof. The proof is provided by the authors in [17, Section IV] and is omitted here for brevity.
Example (Degraded Switch Model):
We consider an example of the two-transmitter tworeceiver channel where the first legitimate receiver has access to the noisy version of each of the two transmitted values in a time-sharing (switched) manner, without interference from the other transmitter (Fig. 4) . The second legitimate receiver has access to a noisy version of the first receiver, and the eavesdropper has access to a noisy version of the second receiver. The switch channel state information is made available to all terminals. In this model the channel outputs are as follows:
This model consists of a channel with states that are causally available at both the encoders and decoders.
The statistics of the channel, conditioned on the switch state, are expressed as follows:
The switch model describes, e.g., frequency hopping over two frequencies [29] . The state (switch) is a binary random variable that chooses between listening to the Transmitter 1, with probability τ , and listening to the Transmitter 2, with probability 1 − τ , independently at each time slot. We further assume the state is i.i.d. across time.
where ½ is the indicator function. 
Proof. The proof is available in [17, Section IV].
V. A GENERAL OUTER BOUND
We now develop a general outer bound for the model of Fig. 1 and show an example in which it meets the inner bound (Theorem 1).
Theorem 4. The secrecy capacity region for the two-transmitter two-receiver channel with
confidential messages is included in the set of rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
Proof. The proof is available in [17, Section V].
Dec. 1
Dec. 2 of operating on one adaptable (time-varying) band [29] . Here, it is assumed that both legitimate receivers operate according to a common random switch s 1 that is connected to Transmitter 1 with probability τ 1 and to Transmitter 2 with probability 1 − τ 1 , and the eavesdropper operates according to another random switch s 2 that is connected to Transmitter 1 with probability τ − 2 and to Transmitter 2 with probability 1 − τ 2 . Aside from the switches, the channel is noiseless.
Both receivers and the eavesdropper have access to their own switch state information. Therefore the channel outputs are considered as follows
Since y 1 = y 2 , we also have y
Theorem 5. The secrecy capacity region for the noiseless switch two-transmitter two-receiver channel with confidential messages is given by the set of rate pairs
Remark 3. The capacity region in Theorem 5 shows that transmitters can securely communicate
to receivers as long as τ 1 = τ 2 . (59), (68), (71), (76), and non-negativity constraints for all rate variables, for some Proof. The achievability proof is inspired by [12] , [36] , and is based on solving the dual secret key agreement problem in the so-called source model that includes shared randomness at all terminals (see Fig. 6 ). In this dual model, rate constraints are derived so that the input and output distributions of the dual model approximate that of the original model while satisfying reliability and secrecy conditions in the dual model. The probability approximation then guarantees that reliability and secrecy conditions can be achieved in the original model. Finally, it is shown that there exists one realization of shared randomness for which the above mentioned are valid, thus removing the necessity for common randomness. We begin by developing the encoding and decoding strategies for the source model and the original model, and derive and compare the joint probability distributions arising from these two strategies.
VI. STRONG SECRECY

Theorem 6. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the two-transmitter two-receiver channel with confidential messages consists of the union of rate pairs
We begin with the multi-terminal secret key agreement problem in the source model as depicted
Random Binning:
• To each and every u n 0 , uniformly and independently assign two random bin indices w 1 ∈ 1, 2 nR 1 and f 1 ∈ 1, 2 nR 1 .
• To each pair (u n 0 , u n j ) for j = 1, 2 uniformly and independently assign random bin index f
• To each v n 0 uniformly and independently assign two random bin indices w 2 ∈ 1, 2 nR 2 and
• To each pair (v n 0 , v n j ) for j = 1, 2 uniformly and independently assign random bin index f ′′ j ∈ 1, 2 nR ′′ j .
• The random variables representing bin indices are:
• Decoder 1 is a Slepian-Wolf decoder observing (y
to be the estimate of the pair (w 1 , w 2 ).
• Decoder 2 is a Slepian-Wolf decoder observing (y To condense the notation, we define the following variables:
Then, the random pmf induced by random binning is as follows:
P SW denotes the pmf of the output of the Slepian-Wolf decoder, which is a random pmf. Herê W 1 ,Ŵ 2 andW 1 ,W 2 are omitted because they are functions of other random variables.
We now return to the original problem, represented by Fig. 1 , except that, in addition, a genie provides all terminals with a shared randomness described by (
, whose distribution will be clarified in the sequel. In this augmented model:
• The messages W 1 , W 2 are mutually independent and uniformly distributed with rates R 1 , R 2 respectively. Also, shared randomness F 1 , F 2 are uniformly distributed over 1, 2 nR 1 and 1, 2 nR 2 , independent of each other, and of W 1 , W 2
• Encoder 1 and 2 are stochastic encoders producing codewords U n 0 , V n 0 according to distributions P (u n 0 |w [1:2] , f [1:2] ) and P (v n 0 |w [1:2] , f [1:2] ), respectively, which are the marginals of distribution P (u n 0 , v n 0 |w [1:2] , f [1:2] ) appearing in (46). (Thus we are beginning to establish the connection between the two models).
• The four random variables F
nR ′′ 2 . They are also independent of (U n 0 , V n 0 ) therefore they are independent of (W [1:2] , F [1:2] ).
• ] ). X 1 , X 2 are transmitted over the channel.
• Decoders 1 and 2 are Slepian-Wolf decoders copied from the source model secret key agreement problem, observing respectively (y . Therefore the following random PMFs for the decoder output distributions are inherited from the source model:
• Decoders 1 and 2 then produce estimates of (W 1 , W 2 ), which are denoted (Ŵ 1 ,Ŵ 2 ) and (W 1 ,W 2 ) respectively.
The random pmf induced by the random binning and the encoding/decoding strategy is as follows:
where f andû are defined in (44) and (45), respectively,
We now find constraints that ensure that the pmfsP and P are close in total variation distance.
For the source model secret key agreement problem, substituting X 1 = X 2 ← U 0 , and
is nearly independent of F [1:2] and Z n , if
note that [12, Theorem 1] returns a total of 15 inequalities, but the remaining are redundant because of (48)-(50). The above constraints imply that
Similarly, substituting
, and :2] ) are nearly mutually independent and independent of (U 0 , V 0 , Z), therefore they are independent of (w [1:2] , f [1:2] ), if
for j = 1, 2. The above constraints imply
Hence,
In other words, the inequalities (48)-(50) and (51)-(59) imply that
Here, the pmf P (z n ) is equal to p(z n ) because the marginal distribution does not include random binning.
Therefore, the distributions in (46) and (47) are equal, that is
For the Slepian-Wolf decoding of (U 
From Equations (64), (77), and the triangle inequality, 
Denoting asymptotic equality under total variation with ≈, we have:
3) If P X n ≈ Q X n and P X n P Y n |X n ≈ P X n Q Y n |X n , then
Using Lemma 2, Equation (80), the marginal distributions of the two sides of (78) are asymptotically equivalent, i.e.,
Using Lemma 2, Equation (79) we multiply the two sides of Equation (83) by the conditional distribution:P
where W 1 (u n 0 ) =ŵ 1 and W 2 (v n 0 ) =ŵ 2 denote the bins assigned to u n 0 and v n 0 , respectively. Using (84) and Lemma 2, Equation (79) leads tô
Using Equations (63) and (85) and Lemma 2, Equation (82) leads tô
We now eliminate the shared randomness (
) without affecting the secrecy and reliability requirements. By using Definition 4, Equation (86) ensures that there is a fixed binning with corresponding pmf p that, if used in place of the random coding strategy P in (47), it will induce the pmfp as follows:
Now, using Lemma 2, Equation (81) shows there exists an instance of (f [1:2] , f
This distribution satisfies the secrecy and reliability requirements as follows:
• Reliability: Using Lemma 2, Equation (80) leads tô
which is equivalent to:
→ 0.
• Security: Again, using Lemma 2, Equation (80)
Finally, we identify p(x By applying a computer generated Fourier-Motzkin procedure to (48)-(59), (68), (71), and (76) the achievable rate region for the strong secrecy regime in Theorem 6 are obtained [35] .
This completes the proof.
Remark 5. If we assume that (14) , and therefore (15) , holds, the inequalities (53) for j = 2, 
ǫ }|. Next, let define the following error events.
and E 1 = 0 otherwise.
We now show that if S ≥ I(U 1 ; Z|Q, U 0 , V 0 ) + δ(ǫ), T ≥ I(V 1 ; Z|Q, U 0 , V 0 ) + δ(ǫ), and
By the union bound we have
The first term tends to zero by the main assumption of the Lemma.
We then partition the event {E 1 = 1} based on the composition of the typical sequences
• When all such typical sequences share the same U n 1 (k), i.e., correspond to a single k.
• When all such typical sequences share the same V n 1 (ℓ), i.e., correspond to a single ℓ.
• Neither of the above As usual, each of the three partitioned E 1 events gives rise to one rate constraint. We discuss the first in detail; the remaining two follow similarly. Define
Then,
and 0 otherwise. Here, X ℓ , ℓ ∈ 1, 2 nT , are i.i.d.
Bernoulli-α random variables, where
Applying the Chernoff Bound (e.g., see [37, Appendix B] ), leads to
Therefore,
which tends to zero as n → ∞ if
In a similar manner, the bounding of error probability for the second and third partition of E 1 (please see above) will give rise to the rate constraints S ≥ I(U 1 ; Z|Q, U 0 , V 0 ) + δ(ǫ), and
, respectively. Details are ommited for brevity.
This completes the proof of the Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION FOR MAC-WTC UNDER RANDOMNESS CONSTRAINT
It is well-known that the transmitter (or transmitters) needs to use a stochastic encoding to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to an eavesdropper.
Here, a new achievability technique for characterizing the trade-off between the rate of the
Dec.
Eve
Multiple access wiretap channel random number to realize the stochastic encoding and the communication rates in multiple access wiretap channel, by employing a variation of superposition coding, is presented.
Consider a MAC-WTC (X 1 , X 2 , p(y, z|x 1 , x 2 ), Y, Z), in which X 1 , X 2 are finite input alphabets and Y and Z are finite output alphabets at legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, respectively (as depicted in Fig. 7 ). In this problem, each transmitter sends a confidential message which is supposed to be decoded by the legitimate receiver and must be kept secret from Eavesdropper.
Furthermore, for stochastic encoding, Encoder 1 and Encoder 2 are allowed to use a limited amount of randomness. Thus, we are interested in the trade-off between the rate of randomness, and the rates of confidential messages.
Definition 6. A (M 1,n , M 2,n , n) code for the considered model (Fig. 7) consists of the following:
, from which independent messages W 1 and W 2 are drawn uniformly distributed over their respective sets. Also, Two dummy message sets
, from which independent dummy messages A 1 and A 2 are drawn uniformly distributed over their respective sets.
− − → 0 and
Theorem 7. An inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the multiple access wiretap channel is given by the set of non-negative quadruple
Remark 8. By setting U = X 1 , V = X 2 , and by taking sufficiently large R d 1 and R d 2 , the result in Theorem 7 reduces to the achievable rate region of multiple access wiretap channel without common message [22] [23] [24] .
Remark 9. By setting X 2 = ∅ and V = ∅ (or X 1 = ∅ and U = ∅), the result in Theorem 7 reduces to the capacity rate region of broadcast channel with confidential messages under randomness constraint in [16, Corollary 11] .
Proof. Rate Splitting: Divide the dummy message A 1 into independent dummy messages A 1,1 ∈ 1, 2 nR 1,1 and A 1,2 ∈ 1, 2 nR 1,2 . Also, divide the dummy message A 2 into independent dummy messages A 2,1 ∈ 1, 2 nR 2,1 and A 2,2 ∈ 1, 2 nR 2,2 . Therefore,
Codebook Generation: Fix p(q), p(u|q), p(v|q), p(x 1 |u), p(x 2 |v), and ǫ > 0. Randomly and independently generate a typical sequence q n according to p(q 1 splits a 1 into (a 1,1 , a 1,2 ) , and chooses u n (w 1 , a 1,1 ). Then it chooses codeword x n 1 (w 1 , a 1,1 , a 1,2 ) and send it over the channel. To send the message w 2 , the Encoder 2 splits a 2 into (a 2,1 , a 2,2 ), and chooses v n (w 2 , a 2,1 ).
Then it chooses codeword x n 2 (w 2 , a 2,1 , a 2,2 ) and send it over the channel.
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis:
• Decoder decodes (w 1 , w 2 ) by finding a unique pair (w 1 , w 2 ) such that
). The probability of error for Receiver goes to zero as n → ∞ if we choose [37] 
Equivocation Calculation: We analyze mutual information between (W 1 , W 2 ) and Z n , averaged over all random codebooks
where (a) is due to X n 1 and X n 2 are deterministic functions of (W 1 , A 1,1 , A 1,2 ) and (W 2 , A 2,1 , A 2,2 ), respectively. Also, (b) is due to the fact that, given X n 1 and X n 2 , the indices W 1 , W 2 , A 1,1 , A 1,2 ,A 2,1 , and A 2,2 are uniquely determined.
The first term in (110) is bounded as:
where ǫ n→∞ − − → 0 similar to [37] .
For the second term in (110) we have
For the third term, substituting
Here, this condition holds because
Now, we bound the fourth term in (110),
Now, we bound the last term in (110) by applying Lemma 1,
if (117) holds and
Substituting (111), (112), (116), (118), and (119) into (110) yields
Therefore I(W 1 , W 2 ; Z n |Q n , C) ≤ 2nǫ. By applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [35] to (107)- (109), (113)- (115), (120)- (122),
we obtain the region in Theorem 7. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The coding scheme is based on superposition coding, Wyner's random binning [38] , Marton coding, and applying indirect decoding [13] .
The random code generation is as follows:
Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently generate a typical sequence q n according
p(q i ). We suppose that all the terminals know q n .
Encoding: To send the message w 1 , the encoder f 1 first uniformly chooses index L 0 ∈ B(w 1 ).
Then, it uniformly chooses a pair of indices (L 1 , L 2 ) and selects a jointly typical sequence pair
in the product bin. If the encoder f 1 finds more than one such pair, then it chooses one of them uniformly at random. We have an error if there is no such pair, in which the encoder f 1 uniformly at random chooses
. The error probability of the last event approaches to zero as n → ∞, if [39] 
Finally, the encoder f 1 generates a sequence X n 1
at random according to
. Encoder 2 proceeds similarly to encode w 2 and sends codeword X n 2 . The probability of not finding a jointly typical sequence pair
Decoding and Error Probability Analysis:
) and therefore (w 1 , w 2 ) indirectly by finding a unique pair
nT 1 and s 1 ∈ 1, 2 nS 1 . The idea of indirect decoding for the situation that there is just one transmitter is shown in Fig. 8 . The probability of error for Receiver 1 goes to zero as n → ∞ if we choose [37]
• Similarly Receiver 2 decodes (L 0 , L ′ 0 ) and therefore (w 1 , w 2 ) indirectly by finding a unique
nT 2 and s 2 ∈ 1, 2 nS 2 . The probability of error for Receiver 1 goes to zero as n → ∞ if we choose [37] 
where (a) is due to the data processing inequality. Here, T 1 , T 2 , S 1 , and S 2 are deterministic 
as n → ∞ where ǫ → 0 similar to [37] .
For the second term in (132) we have
For the third term, substituting U 0 = Q, V 0 = Q, U 1 = U 0 , and V 1 = V 0 in Lemma 1 result
as n → ∞. Now, we bound the last term in (132)
where (a) is due to given the codebook C and 
≤ n(T 2 + S 2 − I(U 2 , V 2 ; Z|Q, U 0 , V 0 ) + ǫ),
where (a) is due to the following. Consider,
Now we upper bound the term H(T
. From (136) we have
Applying Lemma 1 leads to,
if T 
Substituting (133)- (135) and (143) 
As a result, the rate constraints derived in equivocation analysis arẽ 
Finally, by applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [35] to (124)-(131) and (146)-(155) we obtain the inequalities in Theorem 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
